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Communications Policy Making, Competition,
and the Public Interest: The New Dialoguet
FRED H. CATE*
I. THE INFORMATION ECONOMY
Mark Fowler, a former Chair of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or the Commission), wrote more than five years ago that "[t]he world
is fast approaching a new Information Age in which a significant portion of
productive global resources will be directed to collecting, analyzing,
transmitting, and reporting information. The United States can rightly claim
at present to be at the cutting edge as we enter the Information Age."'
Chairman Fowler was, and is, correct. Communications and related
industries are among the fastest growing, most profitable segments of the U.S.
economy. In 1991, for example, Walt Disney replaced steel behemoth USX
(formerly Andrew Carnegie's U.S. Steel, the nation's first billion dollar
company) in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and oil giant Mobil Corpora-
tion in Amex's Major Market Index.2 While domestic automotive, textile, and
manufacturing industries fall victim to lower priced and often higher quality
imports, the business of creating and delivering entertainment and information
programming is second only to the sale of arms in its positive contribution to
the U.S. trade balance.3 The reach and quality of our free, over-the-air
broadcast system, the diversity and rapid expansion of our cable systems
(which now reach more than sixty percent of American homes), and the
creative imagination of our filmmakers continue to be the envy of much of the
world.
t © Copyright 1993 by Fred H. Cate. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Director of
Research and Projects and Senior Fellow, The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications
Policy Studies of Northwestern University.
1. Mark S. Fowler et al., "Back to the Future": A Model for Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM.
L.J. 145, 149 (1986).
2. Patrick Harverson, Disney's Dow Debut No Cartoon Fantasy, FIN. TIMES, May 4, 199 1, at 124;
Walt Disney's Stock to Replace Mobil in Amex's Major Market Index, SEcuRrrIEs WEEK, Dec. 23, 199 1,
at 7.
3. Fred H. Cate, The Continuing Battle over the EC Broadcasting Directive, 1991 A.B.A. SEC.
INT'L L. & PRAc. 9. Exports of U.S. television programming and films alone returned over $2.5 billion
to the United States during 1988. Id. The "information and communication" sector currently accounts
for 9.2% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product, while the historically important construction industry
accounts for only 7.2%. Patrick Bloomfield, "New" Economy Beckons Investors, FIN. POST, Mar. 3,
1992, at 18.
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II. THE ENDLESS POLICY LooP
This country's extraordinary achievements in the communications and
entertainment industries may be outnumbered only by the remarkable
proliferation of industry lobbies, special interest groups, attorneys, and
congressional, regulatory, and judicial proceedings. Rather than compete in
the marketplace, in the laboratory, and on Wall Street, America's communica-
tions industries increasingly compete before Congress, the FCC, and the
courts. Rather than develop a better product, provide higher quality service at
a lower price, innovate, or invest in research, these industries search all too
often for the rulemaking procedure or legislative approach that will offer a
comparative regulatory advantage over competitors.
The result is what Stuart Brotman has called the "endless policy loop."4
Brotman, now Chair of the American Bar Association Section of International
Law and Practice Communications Committee, writes:
A typical path involves outside parties presenting adversarial arguments to
the FCC in either trial-type or notice-and-comment proceedings. The staff
resources and time required to complete such a proceeding, accompanied
by the likelihood of an even more time-consuming judicial appeal,
frequently represent a formidable barrier to meaningful policy formulation
under either type of proceeding.
The result, all too often, is a chain of decision-appeal-reversal-remand-
decision; a process that can be characterized as an endless policy loop.'
Because of this endless policy loop, communications industries spend more
of their time lobbying, testifying, and litigating, rather than improving their
operations and planning for the future. Policy makers, too, have become
similarly preoccupied with dispute resolution and adjudication among
competing industries, rather than addressing the public interest by articulating
and implementing a vision of communications for all Americans. Meanwhile,
the United States' lead in communications is slipping.
Consider, for example, the ongoing debate before the Commission and in
Congress and the courts about cable television. The FCC has pursued an
unbelievable array of conflicting and contradictory policies regarding cable;
just to list them makes one's head spin. At first, the Commission eschewed
jurisdiction over cable.6 In 1965 the FCC promulgated must-carry and
4. Stuart N. Brotman, The Curious Case of the Must-Carry Rules: Breaking the Endless Policy
Loop Through Negotiated Rulemaking, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 399 (1988).
5. Id. at 405.
6. Inquiring into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite"
Stations, and TV "Reporters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403
(1959) (report and order).
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nonduplication rules for cable signals transmitted by microwave,7 which it
extended to all cable systems in 1966.8 The Commission also required new
cable operators in the top 100 markets to obtain a waiver in order to import
distant signals,9 but it rarely issued those waivers.1 The Commission
modified distant signal carriage rules in 1972," and then virtually eliminated
them in 1980.12 In 1968 the Commission recommended retransmission
consent as a condition of distant signal carriage, 3 but Congress refused, and
in 1971 the Commission abandoned the concept. 4 In 1970 the FCC consid-
ered allowing cable operators in the top 100 markets to import four distant
signals from independent broadcasters, 5 but rejected this approach the
following year.' 6 In 1972 the Commission enacted syndicated exclusivity,
modified distant signal carriage, and "anti-leapfrogging" rules. 17 The FCC
eliminated the anti-leapfrogging rules in 197518 and repealed its syndicated
exclusivity and distant signal carriage rules in 1980.'9
7. Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of
Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to
Community Antenna Systems, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) (report and order).
8. Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of
Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to
Community Antenna Systems, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (second report and order) [hereinafter Second
Report].
9. Id.
10. Leslie A. Swackhamer, Cable-Copyright: The Corruption of Consensus, 6 CoMM/ENT 283, 288
(1984).
11. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (report and order) [hereinafter
Report].
12. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980) (report and
order) [hereinafter Exclusivity Rules], aftd, Malrite TV of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
13. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968) (notice of proposed rulemaking and
notice of inquiry).
14. Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115, 117 (1971) (letter
from FCC to Senate Communications Subcommittee).
15. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970) (second further notice of proposed
rulemaking).
16. Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115.
17. Report, supra note 11.
18. Amendment of Subpart D of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations with Respect
to Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage (leapfrog rules): §§ 76.59(b)(1) and (2),
76.61(b)(1) and (2), and 76.63, 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1975) (report and order).
19. Exclusivity Rules, supra note 12.
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the
Commission's must-carry rules in 1985.20 The FCC responded to intense
congressional and broadcast industry pressure by promulgating revised must-
carry rules, which the court struck down in 1987.2' The following year, the
FCC reimposed syndicated exclusivity rules. 22 It is little wonder that the
Court of Appeals, upholding those rules, referred to "the checkered history of
the regulation of cable television by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. 23 Henry Geller, a former General Counsel of the Commission, has
written that the "FCC's main contribution to cable TV's development was
inadvertent.
24
In 1992 the battle over cable returned to Congress. After three years of
unsuccessful attempts, the House and Senate in September finally passed a
cable bill.2 ' Although the bill represents the accomplishment of more than
three years of unremitting legislative activity, Congress kicked the toughest
issue-rate regulation-back to the FCC to determine what constitutes
"unreasonable" rates. The bill also requires cable conglomerates to sell their
programming to competing services, a notable policy reversal from the FCC's
1969 rule requiring cable companies to generate original programming.26 The
third significant provision of the bill (retransmission consent) had been
rejected by Congress and the FCC in 1971 as unworkable 27 and is directly
contrary to the FCC's must-carry rules28 that Congress was still considering
as recently as 1987.29 President Bush promptly vetoed the bill,3" and
Congress responded by handing the President the first override of his
administration.3' It remains to be seen what the FCC will do with the
20. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986).
21. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1032 (1988).
22. Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Program Exclusivity in
the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 FCC Rcd. 5299 (1988) (report and order).
23. United Video v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
24. Henry Geller, Communications Law a Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 73, 79 (1985).
See generally Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. COMM.
L.J. 191, 195-202, 215-19 (1990).
25. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460.
26. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969) (report and order).
27. Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115 (1971).
28. Second Report, supra note 8.
29. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1032 (1988).
30. 138 CONG. REc. S16,666 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992)
31. 138 CONG. REc. HI 1,477; 138 CONG. REc. S16,652 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
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mandate to participate in reregulating cable that it so strongly resisted, and
whether the cable and broadcast television industries, much less the American
public, will have gained anything in this most recent regulatory round robin.
Today, broadcasters want rules or laws requiring cable operators to carry
their signals. Without such rules, broadcasters argue that "they would lose
audience" and "the resulting lower revenues would pose a threat to the
viability and existence of many stations. 3 2 "So what?," cable operators
retort. In the rapidly changing modem market, new technologies frequently
make older technologies obsolete. These same cable operators, however,
continue to press Congress and the Commission to keep telephone companies
out of the cable business. "We just want a level playing field," say the phone
companies, "and oh, yes, the continuation of our local monopolies over the
provision of telephone service." Each industry has demonstrated itself ready
to use the Commission, Congress, and the courts to win a competitive
advantage.
One is reminded of the insightful words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, ruling on the fourth set of appeals of the Copyright
Royalty Tribunals' dispersal of fees paid by cable operators for the use of
copyrighted programming.33 Reviewing the earlier litigation among various
programming groups, the court wrote:
Each distribution was affirmed in substantial part by a court increasing-
ly critical of "the claimants' studied tack to date of 'boundless litigious-
ness,"' and increasingly unwilling to engage in detailed analysis of "the
various nooks and crannies of the Tribunal's decisions." Thus encouraged
either to forgo the usual automatic challenge to the Tribunal's determina-
tions, no doubt an unthinkable alternative in the "highly litigious copyright-
owner subculture," or to seek a different Court of Appeals, claimants to the
1983 Cable Royalty Fund petitioned us [the Second Circuit] for review of
the cable royalty distribution. With the exception of two issues, however,
only the circuit is new, and the petitions raise the usual array of noisily
contested minutiae concerning the precise allocations of cable royalty
fees.
34
32. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast
Signals by Cable Television Systems, 1 FCC Rcd. 864, 869 (1986) (report and order).
33. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 809 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1986)
(appealing the 1983 CRT royalty distributions); see also National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 772 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986) (appealing 1980
and 1982 CRT royalty distributions); Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 720 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (appealing the 1979 CRT royalty distributions); National
Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (appealing the
1978 CRT royalty distributions).
34. NationalAss'n of Broadcasters, 809 F.2d at 174 (citations omitted) (quoting National Ass'n of
Broadcasters, 772 F.2d 922 (quoting Christian Broadcasting Network, 720 F.2d 1295)).
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III. THE NEW DIALOGUE: THE MEANING OF PUBLIC INTEREST
The endless policy loop, industry in-fighting, and lack of foresight by policy
makers squander scarce resources on the specific interests of existing
communications companies and ignore the legitimate interests of the public.
While broadcasters, cable operators, and telephone companies fight over who
can provide what entertainment or information service in the home, the French
have enjoyed more than a decade of Minite 35 and the Japanese are rapidly
deploying an all-fiber network.36 The technology which has driven the rapid
expansion of communications industries inherently poses challenges to
regulators. Keeping up has proven difficult, but just keeping up is not enough;
our policy makers must get ahead of the technology curve. As Stuart Brotman
has noted, "action and not reaction is needed in this area. ' 37 It is time for
America's communications industries, policy makers, and regulators to
collectively develop a new perspective about the issues which currently
ensnare communications and about those larger, often ignored issues which
should concern us.
In 1934 Congress provided communications industries and communications
regulators with a simple yet compelling vision for the promise of communica-
tions in this country: "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people
of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and world-wide wire and
radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charg-
es." 38 The Commission's regulations were to be guided by "public conve-
nience, interest, or necessity. '39 The technology's capability was virtually
unlimited and largely unknown, but without federal action the spectrum was
in chaos and the public was not being served. Congress stepped in and
required regulation of the radio frequency spectrum as a scarce public
resource to serve the public interest. With this little guidance, the FCC
embarked on the creation and regulation of the largest, most advanced
communications system in the world.
Fifty-seven years later, Commission Chair Newton N. Minow encouraged
broadcasters to share in the commitment of the newly inaugurated Kennedy
Administration to give new meaning to the concept of broadcasting in the
public interest. Calling television a "vast wasteland," Minow asked American
35. Patrick Oster, France Widens Frontiers in At-Home Phone Service, WASH. POST, Sept. 15,
1992, at D3.
36. HENRY GELLER, FIBER OPTIcs: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW POLIcY? 29 (1991).
37. Stuart N. Brotman, Executive Branch Communications Policymaking: Reconciling Function and
Form with the Council of Communications Advisers, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 52 (1989).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
39. Id. § 307(a).
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broadcasters: "Is there one person in this room who claims that broadcasting
can't do better? ... Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries
is overdue."4
Today, communications industries and regulators face great challenges
involving infinitely more powerful forces, including globalization, optical
fiber, computers, and advanced satellite technology. As the United States
celebrates the quincentennial of Columbus's voyage of discovery, Commission
Chair Alfred Sikes has aptly observed, "[tioday we can see the new world."'"
If the United States and its communications industries are to be significant
players in that new world and if the public is to have the benefit of innovative
communications technologies, we must reexamine the meaning and applicabil-
ity of public interest.
Historically, Congress, the Commission, and courts have interpreted "public
interest" to mean the universal provision of basic communications services at
a minimum price. The phrase "universal service" was reportedly first coined
by Theodore Vail, President of AT&T, in 1910.42 Universal service is the
touchstone of Congress's mandate to the FCC in the Communications Act of
1934.43 In the context of broadcast television and radio, universal service has
resulted in a system that provides entertainment and information to the
American public without direct charge. Anyone with a television or a radio
can raise an aerial and bring in whatever signals there are to receive. Further,
the Commission has identified, as its primary criterion in granting broadcast
licenses, that every geographic location in the United States have access to
radio and television signals. 4
In the context of common carriers, universal service is reflected in the goal
of placing at least one telephone with private line service in every home in
America. 45 The FCC has identified "[t]he preservation of universal service"
as "a basic goal of this Commission. '46 The primary regulatory vehicle for
40. NEWTON N. MiNow, How VAST THE WASTELAND Now? 24 (1991) (quoting address by
Newton N. Minow to the National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C., 1961).
41. Id. at 16.
42. KENNETH GOIRDON & JOHN R. HARING, THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER TELEPHONE PRICES ON
UNIVERSAL SERVICES (Office of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 10, at 2, 1984).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
44. Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 41 F.C.C. 148, 167
(1952) (report and order).
45. March, 1986, U.S. Census Bureau data show a national telephone penetration rate of 92.2%.
See also 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (it is the "duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request
therefore" and "[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such
communication service, shall be just and reasonable ....").
46. In re MTS and WATS Market Structure 4 FCC Red 3634 (1989) (decision and order).
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implementing universal service is a federal assistance program, "Link-Up
America," "designed to encourage low-income households, which are not on
the telephone network, to subscribe to local exchange service by reducing
initial service and installation charges."47
In addition to requiring the universal provision of basic communications
services at a minimum price, the new dialogue must examine the broader
range of components that "public interest" might include. For example,
"public interest" might be defined to include technological innovation. "Public
interest" might also be expanded to include quality programming and service.
In the case of programming, while Congress and the Commission have
stressed the importance of every American having access to "free" over-the-
air broadcast television, they have taken few steps to ensure or even
encourage quality and diversity of programming. Once you turn the tube on,
you get what you pay for, regardless of how mediocre, repetitive, or even
harmful it may be. Similarly, in the case of service, communications industry
in-fighting and government deregulation have left consumers all too frequently
at the mercy of monopolistic and largely unregulated telephone and cable
companies.
"Public interest" might also be defined to include access to the communica-
tions media and the provision of new, innovative services (perhaps, for
example, pay-per-view television, news and information services, hand-held
telephones, and caller identification and other telephone services). Each of
these potential components of a new definition of "public interest" raises
serious issues: What is the cost? Will new services and technologies be made
available to the public irrespective of ability to pay? If so, who will pay? Is
personal privacy compromised? Are vital First Amendment rights of free
expression implicated?
IV. THE NEW DIALOGUE: THE VALIDITY OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST CONCEPT
The resolution of these and other issues may substantially affect the way in
which "public interest" is defined. In fact, a frank appraisal of what "public
interest" means in an age of rapidly advancing technology may lead to the
conclusion that the concept itself is overextended or outmoded.
Of all communications media, only over-the-air broadcasting is subject to
regulation in the "public interest." That regulation is premised upon the
47. Id.
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physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum, which permits the operation
of only a finite number of broadcast stations. In 1943 the Supreme Court
concluded: "Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the
limited facilities of radio .... Because it cannot be used by all, some who
wish to use it must be denied.
48
The rationale that the Court was referring to has become known as the
scarcity rationale: because there is insufficient electromagnetic spectrum for
everyone to broadcast, the government may legitimately deny some people's
free expression rights. Twenty-six years later, the Court reiterated and
reaffirmed its scarcity argument in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.49 As
a result of electromagnetic scarcity, the Court concluded that the government
should be permitted to ensure that the public received "suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences."5
But the very proliferation of media technologies that argues so forcefully
for a reexamination of "public interest" may undermine the justification for
such a concept. Spectrum scarcity has been widely challenged by Supreme
Court Justices,5' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,52
the FCC,53 and many commentators.5 4 Each of these groups has called for
the elimination, once and for all, of the notion that scarcity in the broadcast
spectrum warrants a lower level of constitutional protection for broadcast
expression or justifies a higher level of intrusion into the operation of
America's electronic communications industries.
According to the FCC, "the extraordinary technological advances that have
been made in the electronic media since the 1969 Red Lion decision, together
with a consideration of fundamental First Amendment principles, provide an
ample basis for the Supreme Court to reconsider the premise or approach of
its decision in Red Lion."' s The Commission noted the explosive growth in
radio and television since Red Lion was decided in 1969: a 48% increase in
48. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (emphasis added).
49. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
50. Id. at 390.
51. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.1 1 (1984); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 149
(Douglas, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988);
Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr.
v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
53. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH
Syracuse, New York, 2 FCC Rcd 5043, 5048 (1987) (mem. opinion and order).
54. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.
213; Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 207 (1982).
55. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5048.
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radio stations and 44% increase in television stations.16 In addition, with the
development of UHF television, cable television, and new video delivery
technologies (including low power television, video cassettes, and home
satellite dish antennae) the number of information outlets had increased and
the structure of the industry had become far more competitive than in 1969.
The Commission concluded: "[T]he individual's interest in free expression and
the societal interest in access to viewpoint diversity are both furthered by
proscribing governmental regulation of speech.
5
-
7
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shared this view.
In 1986 the court addressed the fallacy of relying on scarcity to differentiate
between broadcast and print media, a concept that the court called a
"distinction without a difference":
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it is unclear
why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a way that
would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of the print media.
All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks,
computers, and other resources that go into the production and dissemina-
tion of print journalism. Not everyone who wishes to publish a newspaper,
or even a pamphlet, may do so. Since scarcity is a universal fact, it can
hardly explain regulation in one context and not another."'
In addition, the court noted that an argument for a distinction between
broadcast and print media based on the degree of scarcity found in each was
unpersuasive.
There is nothing uniquely scarce about the broadcast spectrum. Broadcast
frequencies are much less scarce now than when the scarcity rationale first
arose in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, and it appears
currently "the number of broadcast stations ... rivals and perhaps
surpasses the number of newspapers and magazines in which political
messages may effectively be carried." Indeed, many markets have a far
greater number of broadcasting stations than newspapers. 9
The scarcity justification for regulating the electronic media in the "public
interest" certainly requires reexamination. If scarcity no longer affords a
principled justification for treating electronic and print media differently, then
Congress and the Commission, subject to oversight by the courts, need to
56. Id. at 5053.
57. Id. at 5057 (emphasis added).
58. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
59. Id. at 509 n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983) (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
226 (1943)).
[Vol. 68:665
COMMUNICATIONS
consider what "public interest" might mean today and whether it should guide
the government's treatment of all forms of media or of none. Moreover, the
public now has access to a multiplicity of new voices and electronic
information outlets, such as cable, video tapes and disks, satellite receivers,
and computer bulletin boards. In the face of rapidly advancing communica-
tions technologies and the varied sources of information and entertainment
programming they make possible, what, if any, role should the government
play in guaranteeing for the public "suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences"?6" This, not the compara-
tive regulatory advantage of one communications industry as opposed to
another, should be the business of policy makers and regulators and the
subject of the new dialogue.
V. A REDEFINED ROLE FOR POLICY MAKERS AND REGULATORS
Collectively, the Commission, the Administration, Congress, the courts, the
communications industries, and the attorneys who represent them all must be
part of a new dialogue about the impact of new communications technologies
on society, the goals of U.S. communications policy making, and the
applicability and meaning of "public interest."
The FCC, charged with serving the "public interest" and not that of any
particular industry, is the logical focal point of that dialogue. As Henry Geller
recently noted with regard to fiber optics: "At this critical moment in our
national history, it is imperative to assess our basic tools as the United States
goes forward into the new century to communicate and compete in the global
marketplace."'" In addition to sparking and facilitating that dialogue, the
Commission must strive to serve the public by facilitating the creative and
rapid implementation of new communications technologies. The Commission
must work with communications industries, encourage them, cajole them, and
offer them forums for meeting to work out standards and protocols for the
implementation of fiber optics, high definition television, and other advanced
communications services.
The executive branch, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), Bureau of International Communications and
Information Policy, and many other agencies that play a role in formulating
and implementing U.S. communications policy must cooperate more fully in
creating and articulating a coherent, forward-looking communications policy.
60. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
61. GELLER, supra note 36, at 7.
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Stuart Brotman's call for the creation of a President's Council of Communica-
tions Advisers is a good place to start. 2 Until the Council or its equivalent
is created, the Administration will continue to face questions like that asked
in 1984 by former House Telecommunications Subcommittee Chair Tim Wirth
(D-Colo.) about the delay and inconsistency among NTIA, the Commerce
Department, and the State Department over licensing competitors to Intelsat:
"How do we turn this mush into something that's real?"
63
Congress and the courts must get out of the way of industry and expert
policy makers. Newton Minow tells the story of his first visit to Capitol Hill
after being appointed chair of the FCC by President Kennedy. According to
Minow, House Speaker Sam Rayburn put his arm around the young chairman
and said: "Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of the
Congress; you belong to us. Remember that and you'll be all right."' But,
Minow adds, while the Speaker warned of a lot of pressure and trouble, he
neglected to say that most of the pressure would come from Congress itself.
One need only review former Commission Chair Richard Wiley's essay,
"Political" Influence at the FCC,6 to see that pressure from Congress did
not end with Speaker Rayburn.
Obviously, the Congress and the courts have an important role. Much of the
new technology poses challenges that most likely cannot be met without new
legislation. Likewise, special vigilance by the coirts is always necessary
where First Amendment issues are involved. However, micro-management of
the Commission's operation is unnecessary and inappropriate.
Finally, in the context of a special law journal issue celebrating the
sesquicentennial of the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, a
comment on the unique position of attorneys is appropriate. Communications
lawyers play a special role in the conduct of communications industries and
the evolution of U.S. communications policy. It is often said that Washington
boasts more lawyers than people; an increasing number of those lawyers are
somehow involved in the profitable and growing communications segments of
the U.S. economy. President Bush's lament about the proliferation and impact
of lawyers aside, there is nothing wrong with being an attorney. But if clients
are to be truly successful, if the agencies are to operate in the public interest,
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if the nation is to have any hope of competing internationally, communica-
tions attorneys must be more than hired guns.
Broadcasters, cable operators, telephone company executives, and program
creators must compete head-to-head in American homes, not in the Commis-
sion hearing room; in laboratories and test sites, not in courts; and on Wall
Street, not on Capitol Hill. The voices of those who represent these industries
have an important role to play in the new dialogue, and in raising that
dialogue from the level of who is going to own the wire to what type of wire,
if any, is it going to be; what quality and diversity of programming is that
wire going to carry; and what is the proper role of the government in realizing
the promise of communications technologies.
Former FCC Chair Mark Fowler has argued forcefully that America's
communications policies must reflect
a recognition of the heavy opportunity costs of failing to address the novel
and rapidly changing aspects of American telecommunications. Contrary to
what some would argue, the primary question today is not how to use
regulation to carve up the telecommunications pie among competing
interests, but how to take advantage of rapidly developing competition to
increase the size of the pie and benefit society as a whole."
We must not fail to heed these wise words.
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